The President's Veto Power: An
Important Instrument of Conflict in Our
Constitutional System

CARL MCGOWAN*

In this Article Judge McGowan presents an in-depth analysis of
the scope of presidential veto power. The Article reviews the history and debate surrounding the design of the Veto Clauses and
highlights the veto's role in United States political and legal history. The Article then examines contemporary debate over the
proper scope of the President'sveto power, including recent judicial treatment of the pocket veto. As this Article explains, the veto
power continues to play an important role in the separation of
power scheme of our political system.
The United States is the world's most successful and longest run-

ning democracy. We can attribute much of our success to the insight
and vision demonstrated by the Framers of our federal constitution.

Our federal government is a unique system characterized by a bold
separation of powers and an intricate system of checks and balances.

The separation of powers in the three branches of government prevents any one branch from capturing an undue portion of power.

Reinforcing the separation of powers is a system of checks and balances empowering each branch to defend itself against encroachments by another.
For example, Congress may check the President with the threat
(or, in extreme cases, the actual use) of the impeachment power.
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This Article is adapted from the Nathaniel Nathanson Lecture Series, delivered at the University of San Diego School of Law on January 30, 1986.
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Congress keeps the judiciary in line through its plenary power to
control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The judiciary similarly
exercises authority over both Congress and the President through its
power to invalidate laws or executive actions. The President influences the federal courts through his power (with the advice and consent of the Senate) to appoint federal judges. Additionally, one of
the President's main defensive weapons against an overbearing Congress is his qualified power to veto legislation.
Court cases involving these checks and balances can arise out of
rather mundane circumstances. Few cases, however, are more important, since a decision in such a case can have a radical impact on the
structure of our government. For example, the United States Supreme Court recently decided the case of a young alien whom the
government decided to deport because his visitor's visa had expired.
Deportation is a relatively routine matter. But this man's case led to
the landmark decision in INS v. Chadha,1 which outlawed the onehouse legislative veto. That decision not only upset a long-standing
congressional practice, it also cast
doubt upon the validity of at least
2
two hundred acts of Congress.
The court on which I sit, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, has often been the preliminary arbiter of disputes
involving these checks and balances. Just last spring, our court decided a case concerning the parameters of the President's veto
power. In Barnes v. Kline,3 we examined thle scope of the pocket veto
in a suit brought by several members of the House of Representatives and joined by the Senate as a body.
In Chadha, the Supreme Court focused on one of the most vital
aspects of the separation of powers-the division of legislative power
between the Congress and the President. This division of power is
crucial to any analysis of the presidential veto. The President's explicit role in lawmaking is embodied in the veto power. Yet despite
its lengthy exposition in the Constitution, the Framer's attempt to
set out the limits of the veto power was incomplete. The scope of the
veto is crucial to us as citizens, because every corner of our daily
routine is touched by at least one aspect of federal legislation.
This Article is divided into four parts. In the first section, I review
the history and debate surrounding the design of the veto clauses.
This history is interesting in and of itself; it also illuminates several
contemporary (and unresolved) disputes about the proper scope of
the presidential veto. The second section highlights the role the veto
1. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
3. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (McGowan, J.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258
(1986) (the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on this case on Nov. 4,
1986).
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has played in the development of our political and legal history. This
examination of prominent vetoes demonstrates that the veto is an
instrument of conflict that focuses public debate, increases political
accountability, and checks congressional overreaching. The third section reviews the contemporary debate over the proper scope of the
veto power. Can the President veto a bill for any reason whatsoever?
Can the President lawfully exercise a line-item veto? These questions
are at the core of the veto's role in our separation of powers scheme.
The analysis of these questions reveals the sensitive political, policy,
and legal underpinnings of the veto power. Finally, the last section
examines the pocket veto, its evolution in the courts, and the importance of the court's decisions as examples of enlightened constitutional decisionmaking.
THE HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT'S VETO POWER

The Early English Rule

Despite its apparent success in our system of checks and balances,
Americans cannot claim credit for inventing the veto power. While
its early roots can be found in ancient Rome,' the veto power embodied in our Constitution originated in England. Through the seventeenth century, the King had plenary power over all aspects of the
British government. 5 The King's power, however, soon began to rapidly erode. Parliament no longer served as merely an advisory body
that rubber-stamped the King's edicts. Indeed, by the late 1600s,
Parliament began drafting laws for the King's assent rather than
vice versa. This turnaround had slowly evolved over the centuries.
The King, of course, had the power to withhold approval, but even
this negative power was quite weak. Royal assent was rarely refused
in the early 1700s, at least as to domestic laws. 6 Clearly, the King's
veto power had declined. In fact, commentators stated that '7the King
"would not veto even a bill calling for his own execution."
British lawmaking followed a dramatically different course in the
American colonies. For the colonies, the governmental model of
early England still applied-rule by total monarchy. Even in the
1700s, the King retained plenary power to establish colonies. The
King thus appointed colonial governors, who could veto any measure
4. See, e.g., C. ZINN, THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 1 (1951).
5. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER 11-12 (1890).
6. Id. at 12-13; C. ZINN, supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. E. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 122 (2d ed. 1873), quoted in
Clineburg, The PresidentialVeto Power, 18 S.C.L. REV. 732, 734 (1966).

put forth by the legislature. Moreover, the King could veto a measure even after approval by the colonial governor. Whenever it was
to the advantage of the crown, the King's veto power was used quite
freely in the colonies. This free use of the veto power incensed the
colonists. 8 The explosiveness of this issue is amply evidenced by the
fact that it is listed as one of the reasons for revolution in the first
sentence of the Declaration of Independence: "[The King] has refused his assent to laws most wholesome and necessary for the public
good." 9
The Constitutional Convention
After the break with England, the colonists steadfastly avoided
creating a government with a powerful executive department because the experience with the King was still fresh in their minds.10
This weakened the newly-founded central government, and was the
principal contributor to the short life of the Articles of Confederation. Six years after ratification of the Articles, the states met in
Philadelphia to construct a new government with sufficient power to
bind the states to a fruitful new union. The Framers envisioned a
strong central government, but they had also learned their lesson
under the British reign. A strong central government could unify the
states into a powerful single entity, but could also overpower the
states as members of the new union. The Framers thus took care, in
designing this new government, to incorporate the positive aspects of
centralized government and to avoid those aspects that had caused
the colonists to break away from the British.
The Framers did not incorporate the modern version of the veto
power into the federal constitution without hesitation or experimentation. The Framers well remembered their feelings about the King's
absolute veto. But participants in the Constitutional Convention
feared that the legislative branch could dominate the other branches
of the new government, thus rendering their desire to observe a separation of powers a nullity. The veto was, therefore, designed as a
limit on congressional power to encroach on the rightful territories of
the executive and the judiciary. Despite seemingly widespread agreement on the separation of powers theory, the Framers heatedly debated the appropriate design and scope of the veto.
The first proposal envisioned a council of revision, comprised of
the President and federal judges, empowered to review legislation."'
The council was thought to be necessary because the President
8. E. MASON, supra note 5, at 17-18.
9. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
10. E. MASON, supra note 5, at 19-20.

11.

1 M. FARRAND,

(rev. ed. 1966).

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21
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would never have the political power to oppose Congress alone. Thus,
a veto in the hands of both the President and members of the federal
judiciary would prevent congressional domination of the fledgling
government. James Madison persuasively argued to his colleagues in
Philadelphia that the council was a desirable veto format. He felt
that without judicial participation in the veto power, the President
alone would lack sufficient firmness to resist legislative encroachment. Madison played down the potential for judicial conflict, arguing that the advantage of firm opposition to an overreaching legislature outweighed any perceived disadvantages even if a law that the
council 12had previously debated should later come before one of its
judges.
Opponents objected to the plan on the ground that the judiciary
was already sufficiently equipped to defend itself through judicial review. If the law unconstitutionally encroached on the power of the
judiciary, the courts could simply declare it unconstitutional. Indeed,
in some opponents' views this ability of judges to review laws again
after consideration by the council gave the judiciary too much
power.13 A judge, as a member of the council, could reject a law
and, if unsuccessful, he could do so again when the law came before
his court. At least one conventioneer thought that the council of revision would encourage judges to "seduce" the President; the chief executive could be more impartial acting alone. 4 Moreover, the council of revision would permit judges to evaluate not just the
constitutionality, but also the wisdom of a law-a duty "foreign to
their office.' 1 5 Some opponents of the council of revision concentrated on the bias and conflict issue: putting judges on such a council
would result in impermissible bias should the law later come before
them in court."6 As the great jurist Joseph Story later wrote:
it would have a tendency to take from the judges a public confidence in
their impartiality, independence, and integrity which seems indispensable to
the due administration of public justice. Whatever has a tendency to create
suspicion or provoke jealousy is mischievous to the judicial
department.
1
Judges should not only be pure, but believed to be so. 7

Based upon these opposing arguments, the council of revision propo12. Id. at 103; see also id. at 144; 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 73.
13. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 144; 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 75.
14. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 103.
15. Id. at 97-98.
16. See, e.g., id. at 98.
17. 1 J. STORY. COMMENTARIES

889, at 650 (M.Bigelow ed. 1905).

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§

sal was eventually defeated.
Before final agreement on the version we now enjoy, the Convention also rejected an absolute veto--one that cannot be overriden.
The absolute veto was seen as vesting too much power in the executive. The Framers feared a reenactment of the Pennsylvania experience, where the governor was reputed to have engaged in a practice
of not signing bills into law unless each was accompanied by an appropriation bill designating money for the governor's personal use. 18
Moreover, some of the drafters saw an absolute veto as somehow
unseemly. It allowed one man to reverse "the cool and decided opinions of the legislature." 1 9 Indeed, the Framers thought that an absolute veto was "obnoxious to the temper of the country. 2 °
The Federalists and the Antifederalists
After rejecting both the council of revision and the absolute veto,
the Convention agreed on a qualified veto-a -veto subject to a
supermajority override. The constitution still needed to pass muster
with the American people, and in that forum, the federalists and the
antifederalists squared off.
The federalists were represented by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, two formidable supporters of the proposed constitution. Madison wrote in the FederalistPapers that the new constitution truly incorporated the principle of separation of powers by
arming each branch with weapons capable of keeping the other
branches at bay. 2 ' Anticipating the objection that the veto power
combined legislative power (as opposed to separating it), Madison
also wrote that the separation of powers did not mean that the new
government's separate branches "ought to have.

. .

no controul over

the acts of each other." 2 2 Rather, the separation of powers means
that, for instance, the whole of the legislative power cannot be "exercised by the same hands which posses the whole power of another
department. ' 23 This restriction was faithfully observed in the proposed constitution. The hands that hold the executive power cannot
make a law, though they can reject a law the legislature proposes.
Rather than violating separation of powers principles, Madison
viewed the veto power as a weapon capable of "keeping each
18. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 99.
19. Id.
20. The Convention rejected the absolute veto unanimously. 1 M. FARRAND,
supra note 1I,at 99, 100, 103. It may be that the qualified veto was seen as more of an
appeal to the legislature to follow reason than an absolute veto, which looks more like a
total rejection of Congress' decision. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 17, § 888, at 649.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J.Cooke ed. 1961).
22. Id. at 325 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 325-26 (emphasis in original).
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[branch] in their proper places. ' 24 "[T]he great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,
consists in giving those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist the encroachments of the others."" Madison felt that although the constitution itself commanded a separation of the branches, these weapons
were necessary because, in his words, "[I]f men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controuls would be necessary. .

.

. [B]ut expe-

rience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. ' 26
Alexander Hamilton followed up on Madison's defense of the veto
by arguing that the veto also served the salutary purpose of preventing unwise laws. The President could use the veto to block laws
precipitiously enacted in the heat of factionalism. The people would
be protected against abuse of this power because the President would
rarely hazard a test of power with the Congress if not backed by the
popular will. This was especially so when the veto could be overridden by the Congress. When the President vetoes an act, he risks public political rejection by Congress. Hamilton apparently feared that
this political risk would unacceptably diminish the use of the veto.27
These eloquent federalist defenses of the new constitution were
met head-on by antifederalist essays attacking the document. The
antifederalists feared an unchecked accumulation of power in the executive office, and the veto was seen as one manifestation of that
central problem. One antifederalist thought that when armed with
veto power, the President was essentially a king in all but name
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
25. Id. at 349.
26. Id.; see also 1 J.STORY, supra note 17, § 884, at 646 ("A mere parchment
delineation of the boundaries of each [branch] is wholly insufficient for the protection of
the weaker branch.").
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 495-97 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
Hamilton's first defense of the veto power was nakedly jingoistic. He compared the
proposed powers of the federal president with those of the much-abhorred King of England. This was a good strategy: the more the Framers could show that the proposed
government of the United States was unlike that of the country's former oppressors, the
more likely the American people were to adopt the new constitution. Hamilton gamely
played on this political point. In an unabashed appeal to the citizens of New York, he
noted that the veto power of the President of the United States would be more like that
which operated in New York than like the King of England's power: "The qualified
negative of the President differs widely from [the] absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the Council of revision of this
State .. " THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 464 (A. Hamilton) (J.Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton's knack for statesmanship was already becoming apparent.

only. 28 Another antifederalist author attacked the veto power as a
violation of the separation of powers. "It is . ..a political error of
the greatest magnitude," he wrote, "to allow the executive power a
negative, or 29in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the
legislature."
The antifederalists maintained their opposition to the veto despite
the fact that the Framers designed the veto power to avoid precisely
the same evil in the legislative branch. Because they viewed the office of the President as a serious danger to the freedom of the American people, the antifederalists derided the position, describing it as
"chief magistrate and generalissimo,"30 "dictator,""1 and "emperor." 32 The thrust of the antifederalists objections are well captured in the following passage of the self-styled ImpartialExaminer:
"When the spirit of America becomes such, as to ascribe to their
president all those extraordinary qualities, which the subjects of
kingly governments ascribe to their princes: then, it is presumed, and
not till then, he may consistently be invested with a power similar to
theirs."'33
The federalists, however, carried the day, and the Constitution
was approved in June of 1788.
THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE VETO POWER

The Initial Uses of the Veto
Almost immediately after the first elections, President Washington
vetoed an act of Congress. In November of 1791, Congress passed an
act apportioning representatives among the states based on the census of 1790. Following the constitutional provision, the act provided
for one representative for each thirty thousand persons in the state.
The House had trouble deciding how to treat states with populations
not evenly divisible by thirty thousand. In response, the Senate
adopted an amendment giving representation to these remainders
when in excess of 15,000.34 In solving that problem, however, the
Senate inadvertantly created another.
President Washington vetoed the act, declaring it unconstitutional.
He asserted two grounds for his position. First, the Constitution spe28. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST W 2.4.53-.54, at 53-54, 12.4.85, at 67
(H. Storing ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST).
29. 3 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST at 113.12.15, at 173; see also id. $133.12.13-.16,
at 172-74.
30. 5 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15.14.39, at 196.
31. Id. 15.16.11, at 230.
32. 3 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST %3.9.11, at 107.
33. 5 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15.14.40, at 197 (emphasis in original).
34. H. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 17781826 247 (1939).
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cifically limited representatives to no more than one per thirty thousand persons. The Senate's remainder provision, however, effectively
gave eight states more than the constitutional limit.3 5 Second, Washington objected to the act because the Constitution required apportionment of the representatives among the states by their respective
numbers. Because some states were awarded extra representatives
under the remainder provision, they had more than their proportionate share.36
Apparently, the veto was well received. Washington had articulated his reasons for the veto, and they were persuasive. Congress
responded by passing a bill that allotted one representative for each
thirty-three thousand
persons, thus removing the possible constitu37
tional infirmity.
The veto remained largely untapped through the Adams and Jefferson presidencies, but President Madison renewed its use. Madison
vetoed seven bills, two by pocket veto 8k-the first use of that power.
Madison's vetoes were largely based on the purported unconstitutionality of the legislation. For example, he vetoed a bill designed to
incorporate a church in the District of Columbia because he believed
the law violated the Establishment Clause. 9 He also vetoed a bill
giving land and a building to a Baptist Church in Mississippi on the
same ground. °
In a veto with a more lasting practical effect on the daily lives of
American citizens of that time, Madison refused his assent to a bill
authorizing financing for internal improvements-roads, bridges,
canals-because he felt it was passed without the authority of any
enumerated power declared in the Constitution. 41 Madison had proposed in the Constitutional Convention a specific power for Congress
to incorporate banks and canal and road companies, but it was rejected. 2 Moreover, as President, Thomas Jefferson could generate no
action from Congress on a constitutional amendment to allow road
building and other internal improvements.4 3 After the War of 1812,
it became clear to Washington politicians that internal improve35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
See infra text and accompanying notes 131-42.
E. MASON, supra note 5, at 53.
Id. at 54.
H. HOCKETT, supra note 34, at 347.
Id. at 342, 344-46.
Id. at 345.

ments were needed. Congress relied on the General Welfare Clause
for its authority to pass the internal improvements bill that Madison
eventually vetoed. Many members of Congress objected to Madison's
narrow construction of the enumerated powers, but they were unable
to muster enough votes for an override."
President Andrew Jackson-The Populist
The potential of the veto as a political weapon did not become
apparent until the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. Jackson received a tremendous popular vote, and he soon realized that if he
could exploit this popular mandate, his vetoes would be more likely
to stand. This approach hit the country on a grand scale with Jackson's veto of the bill to renew the Second Bank of the United States.
In 1811, the charter of the First Bank of the United States expired. Congress did not renew the charter, because the public widely
opposed the Bank's deflationary policies. But the War of 1812 followed, and a reconstruction of the country could not proceed efficiently without the financial control of a bank. So Congress
chartered the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. 45 Its charter was to run for twenty years, but by the beginning of Andrew
Jackson's tenure in 1829, the Bank had again become extremely unpopular. Many citizens complained that the Bank had engaged in a
widespread practice of foreclosing on western land. As a President
particularly attuned to the wishes of the voters, Jackson
knew that a
46
renewal of the charter would be political trouble.
In 1832, Congress nevertheless sent Jackson a bill renewing the
Bank. Jackson vetoed the bill on the ground that the Bank was unconstitutional,47 despite the Supreme Court's decision upholding the
First Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland.48 In
Jackson's view, the three branches of the federal government were
coequal to
the task of assessing the constitutionality of government
49
actions.
Jackson was not alone in this view: President Martin Van Buren
later argued that if the President had no power to assess the consti44. Id. at 345-47.
45. For a general history of this conflict, see H. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-1876 84-87 (1939) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-1876].
46. W. BINKLEY. PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 69 (1947).
47. Id. at 70. Jackson's veto appeared to be more of a popular political instrument than a message to Congress. De Tocqueville hypothesized that the veto was really
an instrument for public appeal. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 110
(J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
48. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
49. W. BINKLEY, supra note 46, at 71.
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tutionality of laws, he would be a "ministerial officer only." 50
Thomas Jefferson had earlier taken the position that "each department is truly independent of the others and has an equal right to
decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in cases

submitted to its action." 51 President Lincoln attacked the Dred

Scott"2 decision on much the same ground.5"
Congress lashed out at Jackson's veto. It seemed a direct challenge
to the Supreme Court's power to declare what the law is, especially
in cases requiring constitutional interpretation. For Senator Daniel
Webster, the Supreme Court's decision on the constitutionality of
the First Bank was conclusive;
he stated, "One bank is as constitu54
tional as another bank.1
At any rate, Congress did not override the President's veto and
Jackson was reelected, both events vindicating at least the popularity
of his position on the Bank. The issue was not settled, however, because Jackson used every power he had to interfere with the Bank's
remaining four years. For example, he directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to withdraw all federal funds from the Second Bank, hop-

ing to cripple it fatally. This was done under authority of a statute

giving the Secretary some discretionary powers,5 5 despite the fact

that Congress had specifically refused to enact a law authorizing the
Secretary to withdraw funds.56 Congress' reaction is perhaps best
captured by Senator Henry Clay's response to Jackson's actions:
We are in the midst of a revolution rapidly tending toward a total change of
the pure republican character of our government, and to the concentration
of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of Congress are paralyzed, except when in conformity with his will, by frequent and extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of our
constitution and not practiced by any predecessors of the Chief
50. Id. at 74-75 (quoting M.

VAN BUREN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED

316 (1867)).
51. Id. at 75 (quoting a letter to Judge Spencer Roane, 12 T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 135-40 (Ford ed.)).
52. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
53. W. BINKLEY, supra note 46, at 74.
54. Id. at 71 (quoting 6 D. WEBSTER, WRITINGS & SPEECHES 174 (1903)). One
could view the veto more charitably. MeCulloch could have been read to state that some
banks, but not necessarily all, are legal. Jackson's veto could thus be seen as a rejection
of Congress' attempt to bind him to a broad view of McCulloch. Id. at 73. Indeed, it
might appear somewhat unseemly for Congress to attempt to force its view of a disputed
legal precedent on the President.
STATES

55. Id. at 75-76.

56. The classic treatment of the legality of presidential action in the face of contrary congressional action is found in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952).

Magistrate. 7

Although President Jackson won that battle, the conflict between
Congress and the presidency raged on. President Tyler's veto of a
tariff bill led to the first move in our history to impeach a president,
ostensibly on a ground strikingly similar to one of the motivations
behind the Declaration of Independence: the "high crime and misdemeanor of withholding assent to laws indispensable to the just operation of the government . . .58
1867: The Tenure of Office Act
Congressional frustration over presidential vetoes reached its
zenith during Andrew Johnson's tenure. President Johnson and Congress tangled repeatedly over the proper course of reconstruction after the Civil War. Johnson, a Tennesseean, favored leniency toward
the southern states, while Congress was bent on strict measures
designed to assure no further uprisings.5" This conflict led to continued attempts by Congress and the President to block each other's
programs. In the end, Congress proved more powerful, overriding
more than fifty percent of Johnson's vetoes. 60
One episode is particularly interesting. In an attempt to limit
President Johnson's powers, Congress passed the Tenure of Office
Act, which blocked the President from removing certain officers of
the United States without the assent of the Senate.6 ' Appointment
to, or acceptance of, an office contrary to the Act was declared a
"high misdemeanor." 62 The purpose of the Act is clear-the language used is precisely the formulation in the Constitution's impeachment provision. While the Constitution is silent on the matter,
Johnson was sure that the Act unconstitutionally infringed on the
executive office, 63 and he vetoed it. Congress promptly overrode the
veto. 6 '
But that was not the end of the matter. As it happened, Johnson
was convinced that one of his cabinet officers had to be removed anyway. During a recess of the Senate, Johnson suspended Secretary of
War Edwin Stanton, a holdover from President Lincoln's Cabinet.
Johnson found that Stanton, who was sympathetic to congressional
57.
(1833)).

58.
59.

60.

W.

BINKLEY,

supra note 46, at 78 (quoting H. Clay, 10 Cong. Deb. 60

W.

BINKLEY, supra note 46, at 97.
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-1876,
PRESIDENTIAL VETOES 1789-1976 ix (1978)

supra note 45, at 325-46.

[hereinafter cited as

PRESIDEN-

VETOES] (Congress overrode 15 of the 29 vetoes issued by Johnson).
61. S. 453, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
62. Id.
63. Johnson's position was vindicated in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).

TIAL

64.

PRESIDENTIAL VETOES,

supra note 60, at 31.
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reconstruction plans, had obstructed the administration and disclosed
political secrets to Johnson's enemies. When the Senate reconvened,
it rejected the removal. The President removed Stanton anyway, and
appointed a replacement, Adjutant General Thomas. Stanton refused to give up the office, and Thomas was arrested for violating the
Act. However, Congress soon realized that a trial of Thomas would
play right into the President's hands, since Thomas would defend on
the ground that the act was unconstitutional. Hence, the prosecution
was quickly dropped, and Johnson was impeached by the House
instead. 5
During the impeachment trial, the prosecution argued that the
President's sole duty is to execute duly passed laws, not to decide the
constitutionality of laws. Johnson, of course, defended on the ground
that the power of removal was constitutionally vested in the President alone, and any act of Congress purporting to change that arrangement was void. Ultimately, Johnson was acquitted, thus setting
a precedent against impeachment for political reasons. Johnson's victory, however, was narrow: his conviction failed by one vote.
This episode demonstrates the sometimes volatile relations between the coordinate branches of our government. The veto power in
some ways encourages confrontation between the executive and the
legislature, and this conflict has a salutary affect on our system of
government. It keeps the political branches accountable to their popular mandates and to the Constitution. Our constitutional system is
based on a healthy public debate and a tension between the separate
branches.
The Johnson impeachment also demonstrates the evolution of the
veto. Jackson vetoed the bank bill ostensibly because he thought it
unconstitutional. Later, Johnson clashed with Congress more on policy grounds. This shift in the battleground of disputes from the Constitution to policy is due to a change in the nature of our governing
law. Prior to the 1850s, the main disputes on the veto centered
around the Constitution. After the Civil War, however, we became
more a nation of statutes,6 6 and the veto correspondingly shifted focus from the constitutionality to the expediency of legislation.
This policy-oriented shift culminated with Franklin Roosevelt's
presidency. He vetoed 635 bills, over one quarter of the presidential
vetoes in our first 200 years.17 In fact, Roosevelt seems to be a
65. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-1876, supra note 45, at 350-51.
66. E. MASON, supra note 5, at 139.
67. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, supra note 60, at ix.

recordholder of sorts. Apparently, no legislation escaped his watchful
eye. Among his vetoes were bills relating to: Memorial Day observance, credit for beer wholesalers, control of funerals, exemption of
religious periodicals, cemetary approaches, shorthand reporting, and
even homing pigeons and parking meters.68
THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE VETO POWER

The President's Proper Role in Lawmaking
Despite over 200 years of vetoes, the precise scope of the veto
power is still unclear. Politicians, responding to their ideologies and
political challenges, have taken opposing positions on this issue
throughout our history: Thomas Jefferson felt that the veto power
was solely a shield against congressional encroachment on the executive. Jefferson would have deferred to Congress even on a bill that he
thought was arguably unconstitutional.69 Alexander Hamilton took
the opposite view; a bill objectionable on any ground was subject to a
veto.7 0 The pendulum has swung back and forth on this issue
throughout our short history as the tides of power have ebbed and
flowed. 7'
In the early 1970s, the restrictive view of the veto power had
much currency. The Nixon Administration was seen as pushing executive power to its limit, inspiring political scientists to analyze the
"Imperial Presidency. '7 2 President Ford systematically stymied congressional economic initiatives.7 3 Many scholars saw the veto power
as an instrumental factor in an alarming expansion of presidential
power. Whereas the Framers envisioned congressional encroachment
on a weak executive, the 1970s produced the opposite fear. Professor
Charles Black, analyzing the use of the veto during these times, asserted that the veto power was designed solely to prevent clearly unconstitutional acts and to protect the executive from legislative encroachment. 74 Another commentator went further, claiming that all
68. Note, 36 Am.POL. Sci. REv. 76 (1942), quoted in E. CORWIN, THE PRESI1787-1984 322 (R. Bland, T. Hindson, & J. Peltason eds.
1984),
69. H. HOCKETT, supra note 34, at 248; HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-

DENT: OFFICE AND POWERS

1876, supra note 45, at 84.
70. HIsToRY OF THE UNITED STATES 1826-1876, supra note 45, at 84.
71. The dispute was by no means limited to Jefferson and Hamilton. Benjamin
Harrison advocated sparing use of the veto, while Presidents Tyler and Polk were not
hesitant to use the veto to further their policies. The pendulum swung back to the limited
use side with President Taylor. L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 87-88
(1978).
72. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR.. THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
73. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, supra note 60, 'at 449-65.
74. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 90
(Spring 1976). Professor Black particularly objected to a systematic veto program
designed to effectuate presidential policies. B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, JR., THE TIDES OF
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Presidents since Andrew Jackson had used the veto power beyond its
constitutional bounds. 5
But it is not clear that even a purposeful, systematic veto program,
designed solely to effect a single policy, would be outside the Framers' intent. For example, despite the fact that the paragraphs
describing the veto power are among the longest in the Constitution,
there are no words limiting the veto to legislation encroaching on the
executive office or to blatantly unconstitutional acts. In fact, if the
veto power were limited to unconstitutional acts, the choice of words
in the Constitution might seem a little odd. The Constitution directs
the President to sign a bill "if he approve[s] . . ." of it.76 If the

President's function were merely to validate the constitutionality of
legislation, the Framers probably would have made a different word
choice.7 7 Approval connotes active policy agreement, rather than
condemnation.
Admittedly, the Framers probably did not anticipate the veto as a
systematic weapon in day-to-day policy struggles between the President and Congress. But this may be true only because the Framers
did not envision the eventual size and pervasiveness of the federal
government. The early veto battles centered on the constitutionality
of legislation and the confines of that forum excluded major policy
battles.78 Today, the boundaries of general federal power are less undefined and the concomitant flood of admittedly constitutional legislation has changed the very nature of the federal government. For
example, on a single day, in 1866, Congress sent President Cleveland
240 private bills granting federal pensions to specified individuals. 9
Moreover, proponents of a limited presidential veto must confront
historical evidence suggesting a broad veto power. During the Convention, the Framers more than once discussed the veto as a protection against improvident legislation. 0 Alexander Hamilton described
58, 60, 65 (1976); Black, supra, at 92-98.
75. Pessen, The Arrogant Veto, NATION, Aug. 30, 1975, at 133-37; see also L.
FISHER, supra note 71, at 84.
76. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
77. See, e.g., H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 147 (1940).
78. E. MASON, supra note 5, at 139.
POWER

79. L.

FISHER,

supra note 71, at 84.

80. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 73 (revisionary council could prevent
enactment of bad laws); id. at 78 (restraining power essential because legislature will
sometimes pass pernicious laws, not just unconstitutional laws); id. at 299 (discussing 31
requirement for override; higher proportion said to prevent hasty passage of laws, thus
reducing the frequency of repeals); id. at 586 (many good laws might not be tried long
enough to show merit if veto were overused).

the veto in the Federalist Papers as "not only . . . a shield to the
executive, but. . . an additional security against the enaction of im-

proper laws." 81 This view is also supported by the early vetoes. Presi82
dent Washington vetoed a bill because of poor draftsmanship.
Poorly drafted laws are not necessarily unconstitutional now, and
probably would not have been invalid in the 1790s. In fact, over the
first twenty-eight years of our republic, spanning seven administrations, only one of seven vetoes supports the encroachment theory.

3

Adding strength to these arguments,84 the Supreme Court has recently
spoken in favor of the wider view.
There are also persuasive policy reasons for viewing the veto
power as a broad tool of presidential review. At the Constitutional
Convention, the Framers discussed and designed the veto as an integral component in our separation of powers scheme. But to be an
effective check on the federal legislature, the veto need not and
should not be limited to bills encroaching on the executive realm.
The legislative branch can overreach without encroaching on the executive. Members of Congress often produce legislation that is the
result of pressure employed by special interest groups. Indeed, while
81.

THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 495 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke, ed. 1961).
82. E. MASON, supra note 5, at 25. Madison also rejected a bill on the same

ground. L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 86.
83. L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 86-87.
84. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983). But see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 285 (1976) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
Proponents of a narrow veto power must also face the implication that restricting the
President to vetoes on constitutional grounds significantly changes the role of the executive in our government. If the President may only veto acts that are clearly unconstitutional or that encroach on his constitutional turf, it must be because the Framers
respected the President's views on the Constitution, but not on other less importantfac-

tars that affect the desirability of legislation. Professor Black's implied purpose in limiting the veto power is to reduce the President's role in policymaking related to legislation.
See generally Black, supra note 74. But in one sense, limiting the veto power in this way
accomplishes an increase in power. Under the narrow view, the President is no longer a
general policymaker. Rather, he is elevated to an interpreter of the Constitution. It is
more than a little startling to view the President as binding Congress to his personal view
of the Constitution but having no power over issues arguably less important. Yet this is
the result of the narrow view, since so few vetoes are eventually overriden.
Moreover, if the President's sole role is to pass on the constitutionality of legislation,
what role do the courts play when assessing the constitutionality of congressional action?
If courts are to review the validity of legislation de novo, then the President's veto is
mere superfluity. Of course, this conclusion is not mandated, since scholars have debated
whether the Framers anticipated judicial review. See generally R. BERGER, CONGRESS V.
THE SUPREME COURT (1969); 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
If the Framers did not anticipate judicial review, then appointing the President a role
in passing on the constitutionality of legislation makes some sense. If that is the argu-

ment, then judicial review must be squared with the limited veto power. Courts would

presumably have to grant the executive some deference when determining the validity of

an act passed over the President's veto. Indeed, the appropriate review might be whether
the President's action was arbitrary and capricious. Professor Black's proposal has quite
sweeping implications for our system of government.
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the legislative process is a model of compromise, the final product
may be nothing more than an aggregation of narrow, special-interest
proposals. There is nothing pejorative in this characterization of our
representative democracy. Even the Framers recognized that laws
could be enacted in the heat of factionalism. Itis both appropriate
and desirable that interest groups have access to our lawmakers.
The presidency can be characterized in a similar fashion. All elective officials must necessarily be responsive to interest groups in today's political environment. But the President represents a more national voter constituency, as compared to a single legislator. A
presidential veto can moderate legislation for the national good, 5 or
skew legislation toward the President's personal agenda.8" Each of
these results is desirable. Since the veto clearly contemplates presidential participation in the difficult task of legislating, there is no
good reason why the President should don blinders and ignore the
full range of his policy, and even political, interests.
A narrow view of the veto power eschews this role for the President somewhat, resting his policy choices instead on execution of the
laws. Admittedly, even if the President's role is only to execute the
laws faithfully, there is considerable latitude for implementing a political agenda.
But if the President is a representative of all the people, there is
no reason to limit his powers to respond to his constituency, at least
in the absence of a clear, constitutional mandate to do so. There is
certainly no express limitation on the veto power along the lines that
Professor Black suggests. 87 Indeed, "the most defective part of the
Constitution beyond all question, is that which relates to the executive department. It is impossible to read that instrument without being forcibly struck with the loose and unguarded terms in which the
powers and duties of the President are pointed out." 88
85. The Supreme Court has recognized this interest. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at
948 (1983) (President "grafts" a national perspective on the legislative process).
86. See generally B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 74, at 58-69.
87. See generally Black, supra note 74.
88. A. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF
OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 116-17 (1971).
The President is clearly a partner in the legislative process. It is not an equal partnership, and the precise balance of power will likely never be fully defined. But as our understanding of the legislative/executive relationship progresses, certain actions begin to
fall in the clearly legitimate category, or the clearly illegitimate category. For example,
President Monroe once told the Congress in advance that he disagreed with pending
legislation, and the House of Representatives was enraged. Such an action, it was argued, could prevent the enactment of a bill even though two-thirds of each House agreed
with it. See L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 89-90. While that assessment is probably cr-

Of course, it is important to recognize that a broad veto power
enables a recalcitrant President to interfere with positive congressional programs. We often view the legislative branch as responsible
for designing comprehensive solutions to our nation's problems.
Without the support of the President, however, Congress' task can

be far more difficult. The potential of a subsequent veto can bog
down legislation in Congress, and an actual veto is difficult to overcome. 89 From 1789 to 1976, only ninety-two out of 2360 presidential
vetoes were eventually overridden.90
While these points most assuredly complicate Congress' task, they
are necessary by-products of our political structure and are clearly
contemplated by the Constitution. The fact that the President is
often supported on veto overrides by his own political party (thus
explaining the low override rate) does not cast his veto in a dark
light. Rather it validates the political, and possibly popular, acceptance of his position. Moreover, when Congress is populated by a majority of members of the opposite party, it is not defenseless against
a systematic use of the veto. At some point, the President's reliance
on a negative power in the face of continued congressional initiatives
will produce untoward political consequences for the executive. Additionally, the President must work with Congress if he is to achieve
his own agenda. Thus, Congress can use its role in other lawmaking
to force a President to moderate particular vetoes, just as a President
uses his vetoes to moderate Congress. 91

rect, it does not make the President's preemptive strike unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that the President shall from time to time "recommend [to the Congress]
such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. If the
President is to be a partner in the legislative process, see La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899), there can be no constitutional obstacle to his
announcement that he will surely exercise his powers. Indeed, this is now a
commonplace.
89. In a dialogue published in 1976, Professor Black and Rep. Bob Eckhardt, a
congressman from Texas, discussed the effects of a systematically employed veto on the
daily functions of Congress. B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 74, at 58-69.
According to Eckhardt, even the potential of a veto can prevent any new program from
being put into effect. Moreover, the shadow of a veto dangling over the Congress puts a
drag on congressional initiative. But most significant, it is almost impossible to come up
with a "veto proof" Congress. If congressmen from each party are equally likely to defect to the other side in an override vote, then the majority party needs more than twothirds to be assured of an override. This mathematical problem is exacerbated by the
diversity of interests represented in Congress. In a pinch, each congressman is more
likely to vote in favor of his constituents, regardless of the party position. Thus, the
practical effect of the super-majority required to override is that only seldom will Congress be able to muster the requisite votes. Id. at 60-61.
90. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, supra note 60, at ix.
91. For a more thorough examination of these defenses, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 276-85 (1980).
I do not mean to intimate in any way that these defensive powers enable the courts to
avoid deciding legal questions when they are properly presented. I do not agree that just
because a branch can engage in constitutional self-help, the courts should not intervene.
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The Line-Item Veto

Perhaps one of the most hotly contested aspects of the veto power,
even today, is the extent to which the President may veto only part

of a bill. The so-called "line-item" veto would allow the President to
sign one part of an act and veto another part simultaneously.
This controversy is by no means new. In 1830, President Jackson
signed a bill and simultaneously sent a message to Congress that

essentially restricted the reach of the statute. 2 In 1842, John Tyler
followed Jackson's precedent and also issued a message restricting
the scope of an act he had signed. The House protested, calling the
message "a defacement of the public records and archives.

'9 3

In

1920, President Wilson ignored one section of a merchant marine
bill and refused to carry it out on the ground that it was unconstitu-

tional.94 More recently, President Nixon signed a military authorization bill in 1971 but stated that he would treat one of the sections as
invalid. 95 That section urged the President to set a final date for
withdrawing American troops from Southeast Asia. The President
stated: "[That section] is without binding force or effect, and it does

not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be
brought to an end. My signing of the bill that contains this section,
therefore, will not change the policies I have pursued. . . ." President Ford followed Nixon's lead in a 1976 defense appropriations

bill, stating he would treat the disputed portion as a complete
97
nullity.
Many have concluded that the courts have no role in deciding these disputes between
branches. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986); J. CHOPER, supra, at 263. These issues have
been rehearsed elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this Article.
92. At the time, Congress was in recess and could not react. But a later Congress
deemed the action an attempted line-item veto. H.R. REP. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess.
5-6 (1842); L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 90.

93.

L.

FISHER,

supra note 71, at 90-91.

94. Id. at 92.
95. Id.
96. PUB. PAPERS 1114 (1971), reprintedin DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146
annex A (E.D.N.Y. 1972). One court regarded this statement as "very unfortunate" and
without "either validity or effect." DaCosta, 55 F.R.D. at 146.
97. The bill provided that certain executive actions required the approval of the
Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of both Houses. L. FISHER, supra note
71, at 93.
A related question is how much deference courts should pay to "contemporaneous"
construction of a law by a signing President. President Truman signed a bill and sent a
message to Congress purportedly construing some of the more ambiguous provision of the
act. I concur in Professor Corwin's conclusion that courts cannot normally afford such a
message much weight. Otherwise, the President could attribute an entirely different in-

As applied to appropriations bills, the line-item veto was until
fairly recently an accepted, if not acknowledged, practice. Prior to
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974,98 appropriations were generally considered permissive. 9 Often in public works legislation, the
President would choose to carry out some projects and not others.
After abuses that led to enactment of the Impoundment Control
Act, the President must follow strict procedures that call for either
one- or two-house approval if he desires to withhold money. 100 INS
v. Chadha,10 ' however, casts serious doubt upon the validity of the
Act.

A line-item veto statute for appropriations was recently pending in
the Senate. 10 2 The proposal was, in fact, quite simple. The legislation
would have required the Clerk of the House of Representatives to
divide up each numbered paragraph or item into a separate bill to be
sent to the White House. Thus, each separate paragraph would have
become an individual bill subject to an independent veto.
The text of the Constitution gives us little guidance on the constitutionality of such a measure. The Constitution clearly speaks of approval or disapproval of a whole bill at once, not piecemeal consideration of its parts.103 A change in "styling" may not be sufficient to
tention to the Congress. See E. CORWIN, supra note 68, at 323-24; see also Clineburg,
supra note 7, at 749 (describing a similar incident under President Jackson). A similar
question faces the Supreme Court this Term. In Thornburg v. Gingles, (No. 83-1968),
the executive branch has taken a position that the Voting Rights Act does not bar a
redistricting plan of the North Carolina Legislature. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (case below). Several Senators and Representatives (including prominent Republicans) have filed an amicus brief arguing that the Administration's
interpretation is totally contrary to the legislative intent. 1985 Facts on File World News
Digest 662 Di (Sept. 6, 1985). This puts the Court in a peculiar position-can it look at
later expressions of the ostensible intent of a previous Congress when those later expressions are not of the full Congress? See also United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 94448 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (contemporaneous statements of individual legislators found ambiguous), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1262 (1986).
98. Pub. L. No. 93-344, Title X, § 1001, 88 Stat. 332 (1974) (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982)).
99. L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 91-92.
100. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 684, 688 (1982).
101. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
102. S. 43, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1986) (after lengthy debate, the Senate narrowly
voted to not grant the bill a full hearing. Another vote on the bill was not called prior to
end of the Ist Session). Congress has considered the line-item veto many times. For
example, President Grant vainly asked Congress for a line-item veto power but was unsuccessful. H. LAsKI, supra note 77, at 149. President Hayes opposed the congressional
practice of appropriation riders. See J. RICHARDSON. MESSAGES & PAPERS IX, 4475,
4488, 4495 (April 29, May 29, June 23, 1879). After a series of vetoes, he finally prevailed. L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 85.
103. The Constitution requires "le]very bill" that has passed both Houses to be
presented to the President. But the document does not define a "bill." U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 7, cl.2. Arguably, a bill could consist of the core of provisions all relating to a single
subject. See, e.g., Clineburg, supra note 7, at 750-52; Givens, The Validity of a Separate
Veto of Nongerinane Riders to Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60 (1965). But see Comment,
Separation of Powers: CongressionalRiders and the Veto Power, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
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overcome the constitutional difficulties. The Veto Clause is one of
the checks and balances in our system of separation of powers. Any

change in the nature or effect of the Clause will necessarily implicate
separation of powers concerns. These issues do not reside solely in
academic playgrounds. They have a very real effect on constitutional
decisionmaking in the courts. As the Chadha case teaches, the Supreme Court is very wary of fiddling with the constitutional balance
struck between Congress and the President. Chief Justice Burger
made this very clear:
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the
legislative process ....
These provisions of [Article] I are integral parts of
the constitutional design for the separation of powers ....
It emerges
clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Article I, [Sections] 1
[and] 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the
Federal Government be exercised in accord
with a single, finely wrought
10
and exhaustively considered, procedure. '

As Chadha shows, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to strike

down schemes that interfere with the spirit of separation of powers,

even though no explicit textual limitation exists. In Myers v. United

States,10 5 for example, the Court rejected a statute that constrained

the President's power to remove certain executive officers. The Court

ruled that the power of removal is an inherent corollary to the power

of appointment, at least in some cases.108 The Court based the ruling

not on the text of the Constitution, but rather on the nature of the
executive power. The Myers approach to the separation of powers
735 (1973) (arguing that line-item veto violates separation-of-powers policy). The resolution of this question could be crucial should the line-item veto ever reach the courts and
be decided on the merits. A decision on this point would go far beyond the line-item veto
because it would restrict congressional action on riders as well. For example, a ruling
adverse to the line-item veto might prohibit adding a reapportionment rider to a defensespending bill because, together, the subjects do not constitute a "bill" in the constitutional sense. Congress has attempted to force the President's hand with such nongermane
riders. L. FISHER, supra note 71, at 93.
This analysis of the definition of a bill will be informed by congressional practice. It is
commonplace that Congress can, through its actions, influence courts' interpretations of
constitutional concepts. The line-item veto might be a perfect example. Although the
Constitution refers to "bills," a court's main reference for a definition of that term may
well be congressional practice. A court cannot define terms in the abstract; rather, it
must look to Congress' actions to discern the meaning of this term. This is not to say that
the mere fact that a congressional practice exists validates that very practice. Rather, the
practice may provide a starting point for a court's analysis.
104. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945, 946, 951 (1983).
105. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
106. But see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

issue is well established. 1°7 Thus, the line-item veto will likely survive
constitutional scrutiny only if it retains the essence of legislative
power in the Congress. This, of course, is the nub of the problem.
Moreover, for constitutional purposes, it makes no constitutional
difference that Congress may agree to give up some power to the
President in contrast to a presidential encroachment on Congress'
powers or vice versa. The separation of powers protects not the three
branches of our federal government but the people. The Framers
designed the Constitution with three branches in order to avoid an
undue concentration of power in the hands of any single entity because concentration of power was thought to lead to tyranny.108 For
purposes of constitutional analysis, it matters not how the power
came into a single entity's hands. The Constitution is violated if a
single branch, through any means whatsoever, acquires more power
than the Constitution gives it.
The line-item veto can be viewed as just such a transference of
power. When Congress relinquishes its ability and duty to construct
wholesale solutions to our nation's problems, the Constitution's
"finely wrought . . . procedure''1 0 9 is at stake. Admittedly, when

limited to the appropriations context, the line-item veto does not conjure up visions of impending tyranny. But it is a mistake to view
appropriations as a different creature for constitutional purposes.
Designating appropriations is a key element of one of the gravest
federal problems of recent times-balancing the budget. Just as the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985110 (the

"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" Act) was a congressional attempt to
solve this problem, so are decisions on how to spread the wealth
throughout the federal budget. Thus, the line-item veto is better analyzed outside the appropriations context.
I do not intend to canvass entirely the legality of the line-item veto
legislation. The arguments have been well rehearsed elsewhere.,,"
For purposes of this Article, however, the line-item veto legislation
raises sharp separation of powers questions. Thus, it is important to
explore briefly what ramifications this legislation presents for the
delicate balance of power between the executive and legislative
branches.
The obvious question raised by the line-item veto is whether it impermissibly transfers the legislative power of article I into article II
107. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982); Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977).
108. C. MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, vol. I, book XI, at 151-52 (1823).
109. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, 2 U.S.C.A. § 901 et. seq. (West Supp.
1986).
111. See, e.g., Symposium on the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 157 (1985).
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hands, thereby upsetting the constitutional scheme." 2 At the nub of
this issue is a definition of the legislative power within the meaning
of article I. Once we have determined the kernel of legislative power,
the issue of improper transfer follows more easily.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never conclusively treated
the boundaries of article I vis-a-vis article II. The Court came close,
however, in The Steel Seizure Case."' When the Nation's steel mills
were struck in the midst of the Korean War, President Eisenhower
ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the mills. The President
justified this action as imperative to continue the war effort and incident to his powers as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Court rejected the seizure, but the grounds for finding it illegal were varied.
It appears that despite the wide-ranging comments of several Justices on the limits of article II, the case was decided on a narrower
ground.114 At least four concurring Justices found the action illegal
because Congress, in legislating on labor problems, had expressly
considered and rejected giving such a power to the President." 5
Since the Court would not construe the President's military powers
to allow this kind of domestic activity, the seizure was struck down.
Narrowly construed, The Steel Seizure Case only defines the presi*dential military power and the limit of implied presidential power in
the face of contrary congressional action."'
While The Steel Seizure Case restricts presidential power, it cannot be taken as a case delimiting congressional power. There is some
language arguably defining Congress' article I powers, but the
Court's main concern was the legality of the seizure-an executive
action taken contrary to admittedly valid congressional action. Justice Jackson's influential concurrence focuses entirely on executive
power in the face of congressional action. He defined three categories of analysis: presidential action pursuant to congressional authorization, where presidential power is at its height;"17 presidential action in the absence of congressional action;"18 and presidential action
incompatible with congressional will, where presidential power "is at

112.
Killian).
113.
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.

See S. REP. No. 92, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1985) (Statement of Rep.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
J. CHOPER, supra note 91, at 323-26.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 593, 634, 655, 660.
CHOPER, supra note 91, at 323-26.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 637.
J.

its lowest ebb." 119
The line-item veto might at first glance seem to fall in the first of
Justice Jackson's categories, but further analysis demonstrates why
The Steel Seizure Case does not provide a rule for deciding the legality of the line-item veto. When the President acts pursuant to
congressional authorization, his power is at its zenith because he can
rely on his own constitutional powers or on powers granted him by
Congress. As far as the line-item veto is concerned, however, no one
claims that Congress has granted the President inherent power to
veto legislation paragraph by paragraph, nor is such a delegation
granted by article II. Such an interpretation of article II would run
contrary to the long-perceived understanding of article II. Thus, if
Justice Jackson's concurrence provides a relevant mode of analysis,
presidential authority must emanate from the line-item veto legislation itself. But the question presented by the line-item veto is not the
President's authority to execute the line-item veto law. Rather, the
validity of the line-item veto legislation itself is at stake. Presidential
authority is augmented by legislation granting the executive branch
certain powers only when that enabling legislation is itself valid.
That is the question under consideration here. To sharpen the point
somewhat, no one doubted in The Steel Seizure Case that Congress
had authority to enact the Taft-Hartley Act. In that act, several Justices found that Congress had considered and rejected seizure as a
remedy for labor strife. With the line-item veto, we must overcome
this initial question before reaching the issue of how the legislation
affects the President's powers.
Nonetheless, the above analysis does raise a related point on the
power of Congress to delegate authority to the President. Justice
Jackson's concurrence merely states that a valid delegation increases
presidential power. In and of itself, this is hardly a startling conclusion. But the delegation doctrine cases do provide arguable support
for the validity of the line-item veto legislation. Over the past fifty
years, the Supreme Court has not struck down a single delegation of
lawmaking authority from Congress to the President. 20 While some
commentators believe that the prospect of the Court ever striking
down a single delegation again is nil, 21 there is a smattering of sup123
port on the Court 122 as well as among the academic community
for the doctrine's continued vitality.
119. Id. at 673-38.
120. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, at 149-50 (1978).
121. See, e.g., id.
122. See, e.g., American Textile v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
123. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1985).
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The doctrine is relevant to the line-item veto because the delegation doctrine allows Congress to pass some of its powers to the executive. At the outset, it is important to note that line-item veto legis-

lation is process-oriented, rather than outcome-oriented. It is

undisputed that the delegation doctrine does not allow Congress to
delegate to the executive the authority to enact a code of laws on a
particular subject without at least an organic act that can be construed to provide standards. 124 Rather than a delegation of power to
fill in the interstices of a law, such a delegation would be an abdication of the lawmaking role. 125 An accepted interpretation of the Supreme Court's delegation cases requires Congress to set judicially
enforceable standards before it may delegate lawmaking authority to
agencies. When such standards are explicitly stated (or at least judicially inferable), Congress has in fact legislated, and the subsequent
delegation can be seen as a "necessary and proper" element of the
legislative scheme. 2 ' Moreover, the agency's subsequent interpretation of the organic act can be seen as an execution of the laws pursuant to article 11.127
The line-item veto legislation stands on slightly different footing.
The legislation is not substantive; it is procedural. The procedure affected is the distribution of power between the legislative and executive branches, as defined in article I and article II. The validity of
the delegation of power goes to the validity of the line-item veto legislation itself. If articles I and II disable congressional action on the
line-item veto, any presidential power exercised pursuant to such a
statute is a fortiori invalid. In the typical delegation cases, there is
no question that Congress can legislate in the area. Using the delegation doctrine to validate the line-item veto is classic bootstrapping.
Moreover, when put to this office, the delegation doctrine validates
much greater delegations than just the line-item veto. For example,
under this theory Congress could legally delegate the design and enforcement of all federal criminal statutes to the President with
124. Cf. I K. DAVIs, supra note 120, §§ 3.5-3.7 (arguing that requirement of standards is weak, if not nonexistent).
125. Id. § 3.4, at 159.
126. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
127. By referring to article II agencies, I mean only to point up the separation-ofpowers problems between the executive and legislative branches. Some agencies are "independent" and hold a precarious theoretical position in our government. See Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government:Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Note, Incorporationof Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985).

merely an act that executes the delegation.128 Yet this is precisely
the type of concentrated power the Constitution sought to avoid by
separating powers. Thus, it is clear that the delegation doctrine has
limits and cannot validate shifts in the Constitution's balance of
power.
With this limitation in mind, however, it is clear that the delegation cases are still relevant. In a sense, whenever the Supreme Court
upholds a delegation, it upholds a shift in the lawmaking power.
Agency promulgated rules and regulations have the force of law, yet
are not the direct products of Congress. No theory can support this
result without allowing some transference of power. The Court has
never held that such delegations transfer the legislative power, at
.least as defined by article 1.129
The process/substance distinction may be sufficient to distinguish
the delegation cases as authority for the line-item veto. But, the delegation cases do admit of a continuum of delegations. Perhaps where
Congress has exercised the legislative power of article I on the substance of an issue, delegations to fill in the gaps are necessary and
proper and do not implicate the process of legislating itself. But
when a delegation of power directly implicates the constitutional balance of power, the calculus has changed. As Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote in 1825:
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any
other tribunal, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But
Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislative may
rightfully exercise itself ....

The line has not been exactly drawn which

separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision
may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general
provisions to fill up the details. 180

Ultimately, courts must be wary of validating legislation that alters the internal dynamics of Congress in a way that affects the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. It is
one thing for Congress to decide, on an ad hoc basis, that legislation
should be subject to a line-item veto. The separation of powers issues
are sharpened, however, when Congress legislates line-item veto
treatment for all bills. A particular instance of deference to the
President may be seen as a political decision; a legal rule of deference goes beyond the politics of the moment and may change the
balance of power for future generations.1 31
128. See I K. DAvIs, supra note 120, § 3.4, at 159.
129. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54 n.16 (1983).
130. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 15-16 (1825).
131. Congressional action that affects the balance of power poses all sorts of difficult problems for courts. If Congress made the line-item veto an internal rule of operation, courts might have some difficulty reviewing it. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969). The internal dynamic of congressional practice may well be beyond the insti-
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My aim here is not to resolve these extremely difficult questions
regarding the Constitution's balance of power framework. These perplexing issues do no more than highlight the fundamental role that
the veto plays in the separation of powers. The fact that seemingly
innocuous legislation can raise such a constitutional storm shows
that the subject of the legislation is sensitive and important. The veto
power is a key element in the separation of powers because it is an
instrument that one branch may use to check another. And such instruments are central to our constitutional scheme. Only through the
paradox of sharing and intersecting powers between branches can we
achieve the true aim of separated powers-the avoidance of concentrated powers.

Unfortunately, these intriguing questions may never be answered.
The line-item veto bill is currently bogged down in the Senate. It
may not be these cosmetic questions of constitutional interpretation
that eventually sound the death knell for the line-item veto. If I have
learned anything in my more than twenty years in Washington, it is
that politicians, like most people, are loath to give up power once
they have got it. Yet that is precisely what the line-item veto does; it
transfers power from Congress to the President.
THE POCKET VETO
No discussion of the veto power would be complete without mention of the pocket veto. Under article I, if the President fails to return a bill within ten working days after presentment, the bill becomes a law. 132 That constitutional rule, however, also contains an
exception. The bill does not become a law if, in the language of the
Constitution, "the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return."' 33 This is the pocket veto, and it has significant practical impact on federal legislation. Of the 2,360 vetoes between 1789 and
1976, 993 were pocket vetoes. 3 This number is significant because
the pocket veto is an absolute veto. The bill is thus struck down permanently, with no override opportunity. If the President wants to
avoid a partisan political fight, or if the President fears an override,
a pocket veto presents a golden opportunity.
tutional competence of the judiciary, at least in some cases. Cf. Gregg v. Barrett, 771
F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (practice regarding inclusion of material in Congressional
Record found reviewable but remedy denied on equitable grounds).
132. U.S. Const., art. I, § 7, cl.2.
133. Id.
134. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, supra note 60, at ix.

Last year in Barnes v. Kline,13 5 the court on which I sit decided a
question concerning the pocket veto. Congress had passed a bill that
required the President to certify that El Salvador was making significant efforts to curb human rights violations before he could send military assistance to that nation. In November of 1983, on the final
day of its first session, Congress presented the bill to President Reagan. The President refused to sign it, and he argued that the adjournment of Congress prevented the bill's return, making his action
a valid pocket veto.
Representative Michael Barnes, joined by the Senate as a body,
sued the President, arguing that the intersession adjournment of
Congress did not prevent the bill's return, and it thus became law
after ten working days. Our court agreed that the adjournment did
not prevent the bill's return, and that it did indeed become law. 186
This decision was not without controversy; Judge Bork
37 dissented on
the ground that none of the plaintiffs had standing.
The Barnes case espouses a mode of constitutional decisionmaking
that I believe is the only way to attack a sensitive issue of separation
of powers. The problem that the Pocket Veto Clause addresses is
clear. Without such a clause, Congress could pass a multitude of
bills at the end of a session and send them all to the President. The
President could not possibly review all of the bills within ten days,
and some would thus automatically become law. The Framers were
careful not to memorialize into the Constitution their particular vision of how Congress would operate. The Clause states that a bill
shall not become law if an adjournment prevents its return. It does
not say that a bill shall become law automatically if the Congress
shall adjourn. Thus, the Framers must have anticipated that some
adjournments would not prevent a return, and left the finer details to
the courts.
The courts, in turn, have taken a practical view of what circumstances prevent a return, looking to the realities of congressional and
executive practice. In The Pocket Veto Case'38 of 1929, the Supreme
Court tackled the Pocket Veto Clause for the first time. The Court
considered a bill that was presented to the President within ten days
of the close of the first session of the 69th Congress. The President
neither signed it nor attempted to return it. The Court found the bill
validly pocket vetoed, since no Congress was in session to accept a
135. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (McGowan, J.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258
(1986). The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 4, 1986.
One issue before the Court was the whole notion of congressional standing. 759 F.2d at
41 (Bork, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 30-41.
137. Id. at 41 (Bork, J., dissenting).
138. Okanoyan Indian Tribes v. U.S., 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
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return of the bill at the end of the tenth day. The Court specifically
rejected a theory that would have allowed an agent of the Congress
to accept the return, because there was apparently no such congressional practice, and such an agent could conceivably hold the bill
"for days, weeks or perhaps months,

. . .

keeping the bill

. . .

in a

state of suspended animation."'" 9 The Court found that such uncertainties would be unbearable.
Nine years later, in 1938, the Supreme Court decided Wright v.
United States.'40 In that case, the Senate, which had originated the
bill, broke for a three-day adjournment less than ten days after the
bill was presented to the President. During that break, the President
returned the bill to the Secretary of the Senate, who "was functioning and was able to receive, and did receive, the bill."' 4' The Supreme Court found that the three-day adjournment did not prevent
the bill's return, largely because, in contrast to The Pocket Veto
Case, there was no question that the bill would be in purgatory for
an indefinite period of time. The Wright decision reflected a practical construction of the constitutional requirements in light of changing congressional practice.
Almost forty years later, our court wrote the next chapter in the
history of the pocket veto. In Kennedy v. Sampson, 42 we ruled that
a five-day adjournment of both houses was sufficient to prevent return of a bill, especially when the Secretary of the Senate had been
authorized to receive veto messages from the President during the
recess. The court, speaking through Judge Tamm, noted that modern
congressional practices presented neither of the operative hazards
recognized in The Pocket Veto Case: long delay and public
4
uncertainty.1 3
In the Barnes case, we faced a slight modification of these cases: a
short intersession adjournment. In modern times, intersession adjournments have averaged only four weeks. Congressional staffs operate continuously during this time. Most importantly, congressional
officers are authorized to accept a veto message from the President.
Thus, we concluded in Barnes that such adjournments do not prevent
a bill's return in the constitutional sense.
The significant lesson that these decisions teach is that constitu139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 684.
302 U.S. 583 (1938).
Id. at 589-90.
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 440-41.

tional interpretation adapts to changes in society. After all, the Constitution is a living document and must be interpreted in light of
changed circumstances. Actions that produced unreasonable delay
and uncertainty at the time of The Pocket Veto Case, over fifty
years ago, now appear perfectly acceptable. The wisdom of this realistic approach to constitutional interpretation cannot be overstated.
The separation of powers should not rest solely on theoretical distinctions. It must also rest on the practical, everyday effects of constitutional decisionmaking. Courts often decide cases in the academic
stratosphere without so much as a blink at reality. The cases I have
just discussed are a breath of fresh air on this score. In these cases,
the courts have recognized the importance of theoretical concerns,
but have not subjugated the effects of the practical.
Nevertheless, one of the most difficult aspects of judging is reconciling the theoretical with the practical. Striking a balance between
interpreting the legal requirements of the Constitution through theory and through practice is challenging and worrisome. The pocket
veto cases demonstrate that theory and practice can be coextensive.
The line-item veto might not be amendable to such a happy, or at
least easy, resolution. A conflict between theory and practice faced
the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha. There, the Court held that
theory, which conflicted with accepted practice, must prevail. Regardless of the merits of that particular decision, the Supreme Court
is surely right in refusing to subjugate theory to even a long-accepted
practice. For denigration of constitutional theory in favor of seemingly accepted practice is but the first step down the road to unrestrained majority rule. Accepted practice is merely another name for
the current majority view. The Constitution commands us to reject
those shifting majorities when they transgress the ground rules of
our society. There is always a danger, however, that the positive will
become the normative. Thus, judges must be careful to decide legal
issues with an eye toward the realities of our world, but, ultimately,
guided by the aspirations of our world.
CONCLUSION

The veto is really but one single check in our separation of powers
scheme. As an instrument of conflict, it has many salutary effects on
our political system: it focuses the public eye on disputes between the
executive and Congress; it provides a check on the legislature's tendency to dominate our tripartite government; and it serves as a countervailing policy tool for the President. The veto does not create conflict simply for conflict's sake. Disputes arising out of the veto keep
our government running on an even keel, even though the waters are
sometimes rough. For the most part, however, the veto power has
admirably performed its function.
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In a sense, the Veto Clauses are much like many other sections of
the Constitution. They appear simple on first impression, but deeper
analysis reveals serious constitutional tensions. The Veto Clauses
make the President a partner in the legislative process. But the President also has the undeniable duty to take care that the laws be executed, and to uphold the Constitution. These responsibilities can conflict all at once, producing exceedingly difficult constitutional and
political questions. More frequently, the constitutional obligations
harmonize, and our system runs perfectly.
The point, however, is that we must always look at the Constitution as a whole to discern its underlying purposes and the interrelationships of its various provisions. Indeed, this is one of the most
important aspects of mastering constitutional law. Each article, section, and clause is a piece of the larger puzzle that is constitutional
law. I hope that I have shown how one seemingly simple provision,
the veto power, has much deeper meaning for our constitutional system than might first appear.

